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Abstract
The anti-Jewish policies of the Third Reich progressed from anti-Jewish legislation,
stripping German Jews of their rights, to systematic mass murder. Deeply rooted antisemitism
and Nazi propaganda serving as a vehicle for ideology fostered an environment of approval
among most of the German public for certain anti-Jewish policies such as the Nuremberg Laws.
The non-Jewish, German public responses to these anti-Jewish policies by the Third Reich
shifted over the course of the Nazi’s rule and during World War II. Most of the German public
supported anti-Jewish legislation such as laws removing German Jews from civil service
occupations because it made positions available for “Aryan” Germans. However, most of the
German public was repulsed by violent acts led by the Third Reich against German Jews. The
German public’s abhorrence towards violent acts committed earlier during the Third Reich’s rule
against Jews shifted by the end of World War II as they became ambivalent towards stories of
mass murder. Concerns for the war effort and constant air raids from the Allies overshadowed
any concerns that most of the German public could muster for the persecutions of a maligned
minority group.
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Chapter One: Introduction

The German President, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and Berlin Mayor, Michael Müller,
gathered with other German citizens on the solemn day of October 18, 2021, to remember with a
mixture of guilt and shame the tragedy that occurred eighty years ago. On October 18, 1941, the
first deportation of German Jews to Poland occurred, beginning a policy of forced removal of
German Jews from Germany. The President recalled that, “The crimes were committed for all to
see, separation and deportation happened at the heart of German everyday life, that is the
horrible truth.”1 President Steinmeier remarked that today most Germans feel shame and guilt
over the Third Reich’s anti-Jewish policies. But what was the German public’s response when
these policies occurred under the Third Reich from 1933 to 1945? How did the German public
respond to anti-Jewish policies that began as legislation then violence and finally mass murder?
In 1933 when Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, his ideological, Nazi regime
would not only initiate a second world war but would also lead a massive genocide against
European Jewry and other minorities. Hitler began his dictatorship with anti-Jewish rhetoric that
developed into anti-Jewish legislation, the displacement of Jews from Germany, and ended in
genocide. Historians like Christopher Browning, Ian Kershaw, and David Bankier studied the
Holocaust, the systematic mass murder led by the Third Reich of European Jewry and other
minorities. Their studies examined the German public’s response to the Third Reich’s antiJewish policies. The study of the German public’s response under the Third Reich began in the
1950s to determine what the German public knew about mass murder and if most of the German

Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Importance of Fighting the Ongoing Threat of Antisemitism
Wherever it Appears” (speech, Berlin, Germany, October 18, 2021), Learn German.
1

2
public supported these murderous policies. Most of the German public’s response to anti-Jewish
policies shifted as anti-Jewish policies developed from legislation to violence then murder. Most
of the German public supported early anti-Jewish decrees but when the Third Reich committed
acts of violence, most of the German public condemned it. However, the German people would
not remain static in their response. When they heard stories of mass murder in eastern Europe,
they were ambivalent, shocked by the stories but did not believe them and chose to prioritize
their own personal concerns over any misgivings for the fate of European Jews, a maligned
minority group.
Despite the Third Reich being a socialist, totalitarian regime that attempted to manipulate
and coerce public opinion through propaganda and violence, public opinion did exist under the
Nazi’s regime.2 The German public’s response to the Third Reich’s policies can be determined
by examining multiple sources. Security service (SD) reports, Nazi party reports, letters, and
memoirs from both German civilians and soldiers can be used to determine the German public’s
response to the Third Reich. Joseph Goebbels, Reich Minister of Propaganda, noted in his diary
that these SD reports revealed that by 1943, in occupied countries, public support and morale
was declining.3 Goebbels recognized that public opinion did exist under the Third Reich, and he
desired to garnish public support and maintain popularity by producing propaganda that reached
the masses.4 Hitler, too, constantly took note of public opinion. When Hitler authorized the
euthanasia program (Aktion T-4) in 1939, the murder of handicapped German men, women, and
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children, he expected the public to support him. However, when it became known that the
“treatment” handicapped Germans received was murder there was a public outcry in 1941and as
a result Hitler publicly halted the T4 program that same year (though he continued the program
in secret).5 Parents of handicapped children wrote letters to Hitler and protested the T4 program,
both Catholic and Protestant clergy voiced their dissent. A German cardinal, Cardinal von Galen,
shared a sermon that was disseminated among the German public condemning the Third Reich
for the killing of handicapped Germans, declaring that “murder is contrary to God and Nature.”6
A bishop from Limburg wrote a letter to Hitler opposing the euthanasia program making his
dissent public.7 Though the Cardinal and bishop did not suffer retaliation for their criticism,
others less well-known were imprisoned or executed for their dissent. By rescinding the
euthanasia order, Hitler responded to public opinion and in his actions acknowledged that it did
exist though it was curtailed by the Third Reich through the inundation of propaganda and
coercion. The historical record reveals that German citizens did not blindly conform to the Third
Reich’s policies.8
Antisemitism was prevalent in Germany long before the Third Reich began its campaign
against the Jews. Violent outbursts against Jewish communities occurred from at least as early as
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the Middle Ages.9 Yet, by the close of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth
century prejudice laws and restrictions against European Jews lifted by governments in western
Europe and allowed Jews to assimilate more into society by attending universities and pursuing
careers in medicine and law. But these relaxed restrictions on Jews’ place in German society did
not assuage the antisemitic sentiment prevalent across central and western Europe.10 Once the
Nazi party came into power in 1933, it did not have to convince the non-Jewish German public
to be antisemitic for the prejudice was already well-established. The deep-seated antisemitic
feeling among the public made it possible for Hitler to share his political extremism, voice
antisemitic rhetoric, pass antisemitic legislation, and commit violence against European Jewry.
The German public were not indoctrinated by Nazi propaganda to be antisemitic, rather Nazi
propaganda capitalized on the long-held antisemitism already inculcated in the German people.11
Despite deep-seated antisemitism most of the German public reacted in repulsion towards violent
acts led by the Third Reich, but they still viewed European Jews as a foreign, outside element
that needed a “solution.”12
Pre-existing antisemitism in Central and Western Europe was not the sole factor in
influencing the German public’s opinion for the Third Reich’s violent anti-Jewish policies. The
inundation of Nazi propaganda promoting their ideology also influenced the German public’s
response. Even before the Nazi party came to power in 1933 propaganda was used, especially in
newspapers, to promote party ideology. Goebbels used his newspaper, Der Angriff, as a tool for
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promoting Nazi ideology, nonetheless, readers were more interested in reading about Hitler than
they were in reading about party ideology.13 Hitler’s Nazi ideology promoted the policy of
lebensraum (living space) for German Aryans. Hitler did not mask his intent of clearing Europe
of Jews to make room for the non-Jewish Germans, his desire for ridding Europe of Jews was
made known in speeches to the German public and through propaganda.14 On January 30, 1939
Hitler made a speech before the Reichstag calling for the extermination of European Jewry- “If
the international Finance-Jewry inside and outside of Europe should succeed in plunging the
peoples of the earth once again into a world war, the result will be not the Bolshevization of
earth…but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.”15 Nazi propaganda promoted the
ideology of the Aryan struggle for lebensraum, the propaganda’s effectiveness is evident in an
SS officer’s report to his wife describing the murder of Jewish women and children as a fight for
German survival, “The sight of the dead (including women and children) is not very cheering.
But we are fighting this war for the survival or non-survival of our people.”16 Nazi propaganda
successfully encouraged young men to enlist when Germany invaded Poland in 1939, but as
fighting continued to drag on along with major defeats in the Soviet Union and North Africa by
1943 the German people became cynical of the propaganda.17 Taking note of the public’s
growing indifference, Goebbels desired to mobilize the public and raise morale through
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increasing propaganda, despite the overabundance of it.18 Goebbels and Hitler constantly took
the pulse of German public opinion using SD reports and Nazi party reports so as to not lose
popularity among the masses. SD reports were made annually while Nazi party situational
reports were made monthly. The party chancellery reviewed the Nazi party situational reports,
which were abundant early in the war but eventually tapered off and requested more detail after
reading the reports or requested corrections. The SD reported the changing mood of the public
but concealed negative reports from Hitler.19 If Goebbels received negative reports, such as a
Sopade report noting the German public’s repulsion at the riots committed by Nazis during
Reichskristallnacht, he ignored it and instead promoted the riots and boycotting through
propaganda that made it appear as if the whole public supported these programs.20 SD and Nazi
party reports are not entirely reliable sources to determine the non-Jewish German public’s
opinion of Third Reich’s policy as they struggled to hide any negativity felt by the public.
Despite some Germans voicing criticism of the rioting during Reichskristallnacht, the SD did not
report it but instead noted that the church did not criticize the violence that occurred on
Kristallnacht.21 However, an abundance of memoirs, diaries, letters, and interviews from nonJewish Germans and Jewish Germans help to reveal how the German public responded to the
Third Reich’s policies against European Jewry.
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When Hitler and the Nazi party came to power in 1933, he openly revealed his desire to
push European Jews out of Europe but he did not yet reveal or formulate a plan to accomplish it,
only that Europe needed to be rid of European Jews.22 Hitler did not immediately initiate violent
policies against Jewish Germans, as to not alienate himself from public approval, instead he
gradually proceeded to violence by beginning with speeches railing against a Jewish conspiracy
to destroy Germany, antisemitic propaganda, antisemitic legislation (the Nuremberg laws), the
forced removal of Jews from society, and then organized mass murder (the Final Solution). In
April of 1933 the Third Reich called for the boycott of Jewish businesses. Dr. Paula Tobias, a
German Jew, describes in her memoir two young Nazis standing guard at her practice preventing
patients from entering, she explained that the Nazis were embarrassed as they explained that they
could not allow her to accept patients that day. She noted that the young Nazis were not rude or
violent to herself or any patients, they only stood guard with their weapons and turned patients
away.23 The boycott of April 1, 1933, proved to be unsuccessful and ended after one day, though
there were places in Berlin that experienced outbursts of violence towards Jewish Germans.
Germans continued to not respond well to the Third Reich’s call for a boycott, not because they
were against the prejudice of Jews but because they needed to utilize Jewish German businesses.
Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, penned a letter asking if the boycott could be
delayed for after the holidays as he feared it would affect the local economy.24 German Jews
were also beginning to be excluded from public life in April as Hanna Bergas, a German Jew,
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recounted when she was let go as a teacher because of her Jewishness but the parents of her
students brought her flowers and condolences for having lost her position.25 Noting the lack of
support from the non-Jewish German public for the boycott in April 1933, Goebbels increased
the amount of antisemitic propaganda to suede public opinion in support for the Third Reich’s
policies. The Third Reich quickly transitioned from antisemitic rhetoric to anti-Jewish legislation
by passing the Nuremberg laws that excluded German Jews from society, which was approved
by the non-Jewish German public, then the Third Reich shifted towards public demonstrations of
violence against German Jews.26 Reinhard Heydrich, a high-ranking SS officer, ordered in 1938
a Reichskristallnacht, or a pogrom night, when Jewish homes, businesses, and synagogues were
to be damaged.27
Some scholars, like Daniel Jonah Goldhagen or Robert Gellately, offer a simplistic
summary of German’s response to the Third Reich’s anti-Jewish policies that most of the
German public were extremely antisemitic and supported these policies. But other scholars like
Christopher Browning and David Bankier argue that most Germans were not extremely
antisemitic but their support for the Third Reich’s anti-Jewish policies stemmed from multiple
sources like ideology, antisemitism, and peer pressure. Primary accounts from German
Wehrmacht soldiers, SS soldiers, reserve police battalions, and civilians are some of the sources
that will be examined to help determine the German public’s opinion of anti-Jewish policies. For
example, Catholic priests conscripted in the German military by the Third Reich served as
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chaplains or aiding in medical units, however, some were forced to engage in battle. One such
chaplain, Johannes Stelzenberger, wrote diary entries offering eyewitness testimonies of
European Jews being used for forced labor and of their murder, “Every day here, thousands of
Jews were shot.”28 In his diary entries, Stelzenberger, does not criticize using Jews for forced
labor or condemn their murder nor does he voice support for it he only described what he
witnessed. Some scholars like Bankier or Browning may argue that he was desensitized by his
time in service as chaplain or he was bought by antisemitic propaganda prior to conscription.
Hermann Graebe provides another example of an “ordinary” German who witnesses and reacts
to the murder of European Jews. Graebe is not a hardened soldier but a German engineer
working in a small town in Ukraine. Graebe witnesses two thousand Jewish people, men,
women, and children shot by Nazi soldiers. He describes the mass shooting of Jewish civilian in
detail, “Without screaming or weeping these people undressed, stood around in family groups,
kissed each other, said farewells and waited for a sign from another SS man…. Then I heard a
series of shots.”29 He is shocked that he is not ordered away but he continues to witness the mass
murder. He even shares about a young woman begging for him to help her escape, but he does
not help. Graebe is shocked by the “tremendous grave” but if he had any condemnation for the
murders, he kept it to himself.30 The Reserve Police Battalions are another example of
“ordinary” middle-aged Germans conscripted into service like the German Catholic priests but
unlike the priests the police battalions willingly murdered European Jews. The police battalions
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serve as an example of some Germans who actively participated in the mass murder of Jews.
Despite their initial shock and some even suffering nervous breakdowns, they participated in the
mass murder of European Jews. 31 Even fewer were the Germans who resisted the Third Reich’s
anti-Jewish policies. Hanns Peter Herz, a German Jew, describes a neighbor who worked at the
Gestapo headquarters warning Herz and his family to flee before they could be rounded up and
deported.32 Another instance of resistance is detailed by Gertrude Staewen, a non-Jewish
German, protestant woman, who actively undermined Nazi policy by hiding German Jews and
providing them with food.33 Friedrich Kellner, a non-Jewish German, voices his resistance and
condemnation of the violent treatment of European Jews in his autobiography, My Opposition:
The Diary of Friedrich Kellner- A German Against the Third Reich. In his diary, Kellner
describes hearing rumors of European Jews being murdered in the east and openly condemns it.34
Helmut Thielicke is another German clergyman who lived under the Third Reich and protested
it’s policies, specifically, the Third Reich’s violent policies against European Jews. He witnessed
the violence committed against German Jews and details his disgust and resistance by aiding
German Jews he had seen mistreated.35 Though the German public’s response to the Third
Reich’s violent policies ranged from active participation to active resistance, the most common
response can be viewed in Albert Speer’s memoir, Inside the Third Reich. Albert Speer, the
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Minister of Armaments and War Production, worked directly under Hitler. He described himself
as not being antisemitic because he had Jewish friends, regardless, he was part of the Nazi party
and used Jewish forced labor for his factories.36 He did not condemn the use of forced labor or
the Nuremberg laws, but he did describe feeling unsettled at witnessing a Jewish family going to
their deaths.37 His response was common among many non-Jewish Germans, they supported
antisemitic legislation but condemned the Third Reich’s use of violence against Jews.
The study by historians on the German public’s response to the Third Reich’s policies
began In the 1950s, as the Cold War began to unfold in the aftermath of a devastated Germany or
Europe as a whole, traditional historians answered the questions of German opinion by proposing
that the people of Germany were uniquely extreme in their antisemitism and their culture of
violent antisemitism resulted in blind support for the Third Reich’s extermination policies, as the
Germans eagerly supported the Third Reich’s violent anti-Jewish policies that led to the Final
Solution or systematic mass murder of European Jews and other minorities.38 The traditional
school of thought that argued Nazi Germany was unique as it held to an extreme form of
antisemitism, shifted as historians studied how other factors like the inundation of Nazi
propaganda and fear of the Third Reich’s totalitarian government affected German support for
anti-Jewish policies. New Left historians proposed that most of the non-Jewish German
population supported anti-Jewish policies because of coercion from an oppressive regime and
constant inundation of propaganda pumped out to the public. The historiography on German
support for anti-Jewish policies shifted again in the 1990s as Goldhagen revived the traditionalist
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school of thought of the German public’s response, while Browning and other historians argued
against this traditional school of thought.
Christopher R. Browning, a Frank Porter Graham Professor Emeritus of History at the
University of North Carolina, specializing in Holocaust studies has written numerous works on
the Third Reich and the Holocaust. Christopher Browning’s most popular work, Ordinary Men:
Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (1992), challenged the
traditionalist argument that ordinary, non-Jewish Germans were especially extreme, violent
antisemites. Instead, Browning proposed a theory that most non-Jewish Germans, those who
were not soldiers or SS men, ordinary citizens of the Third Reich supported anti-Jewish policies
and even willingly participated in the mass killing of European Jewry because they were obeying
authority and capitulated to peer pressure, or feared being considered cowards.39 Ian Kershaw, a
Holocaust historian, supported Browning’s thesis with a similar argument that “ordinary”
Germans were influenced by many factors contributing to their support of anti-Jewish policies
and involvement in the Final Solution. The only criticism Kershaw received was not using more
recent primary sources that were available at the time of his writing his argument.40 Browning
did not argue that obeying authority and peer pressure was the sole reason most ordinary
Germans supported anti-Jewish policies, he briefly analyzed how long-held antisemitism and the
dehumanization of European Jewry by the Nazi regime did affect the non-Jewish German
support for violent measures against European Jews. However, he argued against the theories
that ordinary Germans supported these violent measures and were perpetrators solely out of fear
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of repercussion by the Third Reich or they were controlled by the inundation of Nazi
propaganda. Browning proposed that most Germans chose to support violent, anti-Jewish
policies stemming from the motivation to obey authority and capitulate to peer pressure.
Browning’s school of thought on non-Jewish German’s support for the Final Solution
was quickly refuted by Danial Jonah Goldhagen’s controversial work, Hitler’s Willing
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. Like Browning, Goldhagen sought to
examine how the ordinary, non-Jewish German⎯ neither a soldier nor SS man⎯ could support the
Third Reich’s violent, anti-Jewish policies and like Browning Goldhagen chose to use the
Reserve Police Battalion 101 as his case study. Goldhagen argues the traditional school of
thought that the German culture, even before the Third Reich’s rule, was especially extreme in
their antisemitism which led to widespread support by the German public for the Third Reich’s
violent, anti-Jewish policies which directly contributed to the Holocaust.41 Goldhagen’s outdated
and generalized theory was criticized by many historians, including Browning, Simon, Taylor,
Kershaw, among others. Goldhagen received the most criticism for drawing his conclusion on
the non-Jewish German support of the Third Reich’s violent policies from only one source.42 By
the 1990s historians had moved away from the traditionalist school of thought Goldhagen argued
for and sought to view the Holocaust and German support, not as a uniquely German led
genocide. Instead, historians sought to understand it from a wider context in the backdrop of
other genocides. Goldhagen’s argument was criticized for oversimplifying the complexities of
non-Jewish German support of the Third Reich’s violent, anti-Jewish policies, and was

41

Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the
Holocaust, (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 13.
42
Daniel E. Rogers, "Murder in our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and
Representation / Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust," National
Forum 77, no. 1, 1997.

14
questioned as to why mass murder occurred during the Third Reich and not before if the German
people and culture held to exterminationist antisemitism prior to the Third Reich’s rule.43 Despite
these criticisms Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust received
international acclaim as Goldhagen was granted a Democracy reward from Germany for his
work. Currently, Goldhagen’s argument is rejected by most historians, however, his idea is
considered in the study of how ideology influences people and their opinions.44
As Goldhagen’s traditional approach on German support for the Third Reich’s antiJewish policies battled with Browning’s work, David Bankier proposed a similar school of
thought as Browning. David Bankier was a Holocaust historian and head of the International
Institute for Holocaust Research at Yad Vashem. Bankier’s work, The Germans and the Final
Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism (1992), uses reports from Nazi security service and from
spies analyzing German public support for the Third Reich’s anti-Jewish policies. Like
Browning, Bankier argues against the school of thought that the German public was brainwashed
by Nazi propaganda. Instead, the German public became desensitized by the inundation of
propaganda.45 Bankier also argues against the idea that the German public acquiesced to the
Third Reich’s policies solely out of fear as the non-Jewish Germans voiced their dissatisfaction
with Kristallnacht, the Night of Broken Glass, when Germans were mandated to destroy Jewish
homes and businesses.46 Bankier continued to dispel myths that the German public were ignorant
of the mass killing of European Jewry as he cited letters written by German soldiers sent home to
family detailing mass shootings of the Jewish population in eastern towns, instead, he alleges
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that the German public was aware of the Third Reich’s intentions to murder all European Jewry,
but was unaware of the methods used. He argues that public opinion did exist in the Third Reich,
as people publicly voiced their criticisms with certain actions taken by the Third Reich, such as
when most of the German public condemned the euthanasia program. Bankier argues that the
majority of the non-Jewish Germans consented to violent policies against European Jewry as
long as these measures did not directly affect Germans or harm their nation’s reputation
abroad.47 Bankier’s work did not receive wide-spread criticism like Goldhagen’s work but it was
noted by other historians for the lack of supporting evidence he had for his theory that the
German people were in fact aware of the mass killings of European Jewry as he proposed that
Germans refused to believe it.48 Bankier’s thesis and Browning’s thesis both support the school
of thought that the Germans under the Third Reich were not a uniquely, different culture in
Europe in regards to their antisemitism. Though both differ in their motivation, their arguments
converge on the idea that most Germans with varying degrees of antisemitic prejudice supported
the Third Reich’s exterminationist policies.
Robert Gellately’s work, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany, was
written several years after Browning, Bankier, and Goldhagen made their arguments for why the
majority of Germans supported the Third Reich’s violent, anti-Jewish measures. Gellately
proposed that most non-Jewish Germans willingly consented to antisemitic policies, even when
it led to violence, but he also argued that the German public was coerced to be complicit through
intimidation and propaganda. Lawrence D. Stokes supported Gellately’s conclusion that most
Germans were not opposed to the Third Reich’s violent measures but he argues that they were

47

Ibid, 74.
David M. Luebke, “The Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion Under
Nazism,” Shofar. 12, no. 3, (1994), 124-125.
48

16
coerced more from the media than fear of Hitler’s dictatorship.49 Noel D. Cary concurs that the
media and propaganda were the key causes of support rather than force from the Third Reich.50
Gellately’s and Goldhagen’s works are similar to each other as both argue that the German
public were complicit in supporting the Final Solution, and they are both criticized for not
lending more credence to the propaganda used to influence the German public.51
The historiography on non-Jewish German support of anti-Jewish policies has shifted
from viewing it as exceptionally German to viewing it in a wider context of genocide. Browning
and Bankier both argue that German responses and support for the Final Solution under the Third
Reich came from ordinary Germans, and they are not any different from the people of today.
Goldhagen’s traditional school of thought and even Gellately’s argument, is no longer popular
today. It is in direct conflict with historians like Browning and Bankier because they argue that
the Germans in Nazi Germany were unique in their exterminationist antisemitism that led to their
eager support of mass murder.52 Browning used the Reserve Police Battalion 101 as a case study
to surmise German support for the Final Solution and Bankier provided an in-depth study of SD
(Nazi security service) and spy reports to determine German public opinion. A comprehensive
approach needs to be taken in the study of German public opinion under the Third Reich.
German public opinion of the Third Reich’s anti-Jewish policies cannot be attributed to one sole
factor, antisemitism and propaganda are only some of the factors that influenced German public
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opinion. Historians like Bankier and Browning portrayed the German public’s response as static,
their response remained the same throughout the duration of the Third Reich, but most of the
German public’s response changed with the Third Reich’s shifting policies toward European
Jewry.
The response by the non-Jewish German public to the Third Reich’s anti-Jewish policies
ranged from actively supporting violent measures to resistance. It would be an error to attribute
the German public’s response to one factor as Goldhagen and Gellately show. Instead, many
factors contributed to the public’s opinion including long-held antisemitism, and propaganda
serving as a vehicle for Nazi ideology. Nazi ideology and propaganda used antisemitism as a
bridge to influence the public. The German public’s changing opinion toward the Third Reich
must also be considered as it did not remain stagnant but rose and receded in concert with the
events of the war. Hitler never hid his hostility or his plan to remove European Jews from Europe
since taking control of Germany in 1933, but the removal of European Jews through mass
murder was not fully realized by Hitler until 1941.53 As the Third Reich transitioned from
antisemitic rhetoric to violence, memoirs by Germans, civilians and soldiers, and SD reports
show that the majority of non-Jewish Germans supported antisemitic legislation and rhetoric but
criticized the Third Reich’s use of violence prior to 1941.54 After 1941, when German Jews
were isolated and removed from Germany and as stories of mass murder reached most of the
German public their response shifted from abhorrence to ambivalence.
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Chapter Two: The German Public’s Response to Antisemitism and Nazi Propaganda,
1933-1940
That they are content merely to reject it makes them equally responsible for the
agony of our Jewish fellowmen, for the horrible physical and spiritual suffering
inflicted upon them merely because they are Jews. It is not sufficient to reject
anti-Semitism. It is the duty of all good Christians to take an active part against
it…
Irene Harand, Hitler’s Lies: An Answer to Hitler’s Mein Kampf
When Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, he promoted an antisemitic
ideology deeming Jewish Germans racially inferior and undesirable. This antisemitic ideology
was not new. Antisemitism pre-existed the Nazis but it changed over time. Jewish-hatred can be
traced to the Middle Ages in Europe and over the centuries it shifted from hatred against
European Jews based on religion to hatred based on race. The long-held antisemitism in
Germany paired with the inundation of Nazi ideology through propaganda created an atmosphere
of acceptance among the German public for the Third Reich’s antisemitic policies. The majority
of the non-Jewish German public, influenced by deeply rooted antisemitism and by Nazi
propaganda, supported the Reich’s antisemitic legislation but not state-led violence. Most of the
German public’s reactions stemmed in part from a long history of antisemitism that primed the
German people for a state-sponsored campaign that evolved from discrimination to genocide.
Animosity toward the Jewish people existed long before the Nazi party came to power in
Germany in 1933. The feelings of hatred towards the Jewish people in Europe stretches as far
back as the Middle Ages when Judaism existed as a minority religion in a Roman Catholic
world. Catholics oppressed European Jews for rejecting Christ as their messiah and accused them
of being “Christ killers.”55 The first major outburst of organized violence, also referred to as a
pogrom, occurred in Northwest Europe during the First Crusade in 1096 when a mob murdered a
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village of Jews accusing them of being “Christ killers.”56 In the mid-twelfth century some
Catholics accused Jews of performing ritual murders on Christian children. Then in the midthirteenth century Jews were accused of using Christian children’s blood for the Jewish holiday
of Passover.57 Jews in Europe existed under severe restrictions. They were limited to certain
occupations and limited on the kinds of clothes they wore. A special tax was levied on Jewish
people in central eastern Europe. In the fourteenth century Jews were blamed for the Black Death
that spread throughout Europe.58 European Jews suffered expulsion from various places in
Europe throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth century. Jewish people in Spain and Portugal
suffered persecution in the fifteenth century during the Spanish Inquisition. Laws regulating the
lives of Jewish people in Europe continued through the seventeenth and eighteenth century. It
was not until the nineteenth century that European Jews pursued their emancipation in central
Europe as well as their full integration into European society.
By the nineteenth century, hatred for European Jewry based on religious differences
shifted to a modern antisemitism that was based on “racial” differences.59 Wilhelm Marr, an
influential journalist and cultural historian, founded the Anti-semites League. He developed the
term “anti-semitism” and in a pamphlet he wrote in 1879 promoted the idea of a Jewish
conspiracy against Germany:
Foreign rule has been thrust upon us. 1800 years lasted the battle against Jewish
domination, which hardly ever strayed from its biblical tradition. The Semitic
people suffered unspeakably. . . . it [Jewry] corrupted society in all of its aspects,
squeezed all idealism out of it, occupies the most controlling influence in trade
and daily life, penetrates ever more into public office, controls the theater, forms a
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social-political front and has left almost nothing for you, except raw labor which
it itself has always shunned; it has transformed talent into shiny virtuosity,
pimpish advertising into the godess of public opinion and --- rules you today.60
A German philosopher, Eugen Duhring, was also influential in promoting the idea of a
“scientific” form of racial antisemitism in 1881 in his work, The Jewish Question as a Racial,
Moral, and Cultural Problem.61 This “scientific” form of racial antisemitism developed from the
study of eugenics which was part of the larger movement of Social Darwinism and its pursuit of
the “struggle for survival.” Charles B. Davenport, an influential American eugenicist, explained
eugenics as the science for improving humanity through “better breeding.”62 Like in the United
States, German eugenicists defined the population’s worth based on whether an individual was
considered superior or inferior.63 Even though eugenics was later found to be unscientific, at the
turn of the twentieth century eugenics was seen as a legitimate science used to argue the
superiority or inferiority of other races.64 Germany and other powers like England used the idea
of a racial hierarchy to justify colonizing other countries. For instance, Germany in 1884
mistreated the Herero and Nama people while colonizing German Southwest Africa, current day
Namibia, and used the eugenics idea of a racial hierarchy to justify oppressing them.65
As the eugenics movement grew in western and central Europe during the late nineteenth
century, European Jews pushed for legislation that would grant Jews equality. In western Europe
Jewish emancipation was based on the belief that every human deserves individual rights. But
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then in central Europe Jewish emancipation could only be achieved if European Jews gave up
their “Jewishness.”66 Yet as full emancipation for European Jews in central Europe were being
advanced, Duhring and Marr promoted the eugenicist's idea of separating European Jews based
on race rather than religion and viewing them as an inferior people. Otto von Bismarck, prime
minister of Prussia, declared that Jews cannot be “real” Germans because of their ethnicity and
religion.67
Blaming European Jewry for ills experienced by society continued from the Middle Ages
to the twentieth century. However, this time in the nineteenth and twentieth century the
scapegoating of European Jews was used as a tool in politics.68 Karl Lueger, founder of the
Christian Social party in Austria and mayor of Vienna in 1897 to 1910, accused Austrian Jews of
robbing job opportunities from the middle and lower classes of struggling non-Jewish
Austrians.69 Lueger constantly used Jews as scapegoats in his political speeches. Years later,
Hitler recalled the dramatic impact Lueger had on his own views toward the Jews:
At all events, these occasions slowly made me acquainted with the man and the
movement, which in those days guided Vienna’s destinies: Dr. Karl Lueger and
the Christian Social Party. When I arrived in Vienna, I was hostile to both of
them. The man and the movement seemed ‘reactionary’ in my eyes. My common
sense of justice, however, forced me to change this judgment in proportion as I
had occasion to become acquainted with the man and his work; and slowly my
fair judgment turned to unconcealed admiration.
The stirring of ethnic based nationalism became a roadblock for Jewish integration into
central European society. When World War I erupted, European Jewry felt a momentary reprieve
from hostilities as all able-bodied men were needed in the war effort. However, by 1918 the
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reprieve ended as Jews were once again used as scapegoats and were blamed for Germany’s loss
in World War I.70 The myth of a Jewish conspiracy to destroy Europe was revived as European
Jews were accused of betraying Germany and Austria during World War I. Violence towards
Jewry in parts of Europe erupted. In Hungary, during and shortly after the Aster Revolution in
October of 1918, Hungarian Jews were killed in pogroms across the country. Then in 1919 to
1921 Hungarian Jews were murdered in another round of pogroms during the White Terror.71
Numerous pogroms occurred in Galicia, Hungary, Bohemia, and Moravia as old hostilities
toward European Jews were resurrected.72 The Central powers following the end of World War I
endured an economic crisis as they suffered hyperinflation in the early 1920s. Politicians
returned to antisemitic policies as central Europe struggled economically.73 In the latter half of
the 1920s, Jews in Germany and Austria were able to take a breath from antisemitic hostility as
they attained positions in academia at a faster rate than before World War I but their achievement
would not last as Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party came to power in 1933. Hitler and the Nazi
party rose to power when President Paul von Hindenburg appointed Hitler Chancellor of
Germany. Prior to the Nazi party’s seizure of power, they never gained a majority of popular
votes when federal elections were held.74 Once President von Hindenburg and other governing
authorities had acquiesced to Hitler, he transformed Germany into a dictatorship.
Adolf Hitler, leader of the Nazi party, before coming to power in 1933 accused Jewish
people of taking part in an international conspiracy against Germans. Hitler believed that both
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Jewish communists and capitalists planned to harm Germany.75 The Nazi party was not the only
antisemitic political party at the time as both the Pan-German League and Austrian Pan-German
League also had antisemitic platforms. The National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP)
or the Nazi party, promised the German people that they would reverse the provisions of the
Versailles Treaty, they would pull Germany from the Great Depression, and establish Germany
as a world power. Along with these promises the rhetoric of the burgeoning Nazi party was rife
with antisemitic messages. The party’s designs toward German Jews were made clear in its
founding documents:
The Ostjuden must be got rid of without delay, and ruthless measures must
be taken immediately against all other Jews. Such measures might be, for
instance, the introduction of lists of Jews in every city or community, the
immediate removal of Jews from all Government employment, newspaper offices,
theaters, cinemas, etc.; in short, the Jew must be deprived of all possibilities to
continue to make his disastrous influence felt. In order that the unemployed
Semites cannot secretly undermine us and agitate against us, they should be
placed in collecting camps...76
The antisemitic, Nazi ideology saw no place for European Jews as they were considered
outsiders and not true Germans or Aryans. In Mein Kampf, Hitler describes the struggle of
Aryans for living space in Europe against European Jewry and other minorities Hitler viewed as
undesirable.77 The Nazi party ran for election in 1928 to 1933 as they failed to obtain a majority
of votes in the Reichstag. After the November 1932 elections, President von Hindenburg made
Hitler chancellor of Germany a few months later in January 1933. Hitler effectively consolidated
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all governmental authority to himself and by passing the Enabling Acts in March 1933 Hitler
could establish laws without passing it through a parliamentary body.78 Through the Enabling
acts Hitler was able to legalize discrimination and abuse of European Jews. A state sanctioned
boycott of Jewish businesses began on April 1, 1933.79 The Nazi party called for the boycott and
gave instructions for how to proceed with the boycott, “The principle must be that no German
will any longer buy from a Jew or allow Jews or their agents to recommend goods. The boycott
must be general. It must be carried out by the whole nation and must hit the Jews in their most
sensitive spot.”80 However, the “whole nation” did not participate. The boycott was largely
opposed by the German people leading Hitler to reverse the failed policy after only a day. Two
years later in 1935, the Nuremberg Laws revoked Jewish Germans of their citizenship and
redefining German citizenship as those who are of full German blood. Intermarriage between
“Aryans” and non-German Jews was prohibited.81 The Nuremberg Laws further codified Jewish
ethnicity and legalized discrimination against Jews. Major mass violence against Jewish
Germans occurred in March 1938 when the non-Jewish Austrians who supported the “annex” of
Austria reacted in celebration by rioting against Jewish homes and businesses.82 Hitler condoned
the violence setting a precedent for continued acts of violence towards Jews without fear of legal
repercussions.83 Antisemitic legislation and outbursts of violence were not enough as the Third
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Reich pursued policies to force Jews out of Germany, specifically Jews who had immigrated to
Germany from parts of eastern Europe before 1933. Some Jewish Germans attempted to leave
Germany but could not afford to as the Third Reich placed a heavy tax on Jews trying to
emigrate.84 The violence towards Jews in Germany and Austria escalated when the murder of a
German diplomat in Paris by a Jewish young man, Herschel Grynszpan, was used as an excuse to
attack Jewish people, their businesses, homes, and places of worship.85 Rioting against Jewish
Germans occurred in early November but an organized pogrom, Kristallnacht, was officially
sanctioned by Reinhard Heydrich, chief of Reich Security and high ranking SS official. Heydrich
ordered Jewish businesses and apartments damaged. Police were restricted from preventing
attacks on Jewish buildings.86 From Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 to the start of World War II on
September 1, 1939, Jewish Germans and non-Jewish Germans witnessed the gradual shifting of
antisemitic rhetoric and legislation to state sanctioned violence, but the Third Reich’s antisemitic
policies would not end with riots and deportations. The war in Europe from 1939 to 1945
enabled the expansion of Nazi antisemitic policies from discrimination and intimidation to
organized mass murder.
In early 1933 when legislation was passed in March removing Jewish Germans from civil
service occupations the German public responded with support as the newly vacant positions
provided job opportunities for non-Jewish Germans.87 A month later when a state sanctioned
boycott was called the non-Jewish German public did not support the violence that occurred
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during the boycott and the boycott itself, as the German public feared the potential economic
harm it would have on the already struggling economy.88 Dr. Paula Tobias describes the boycott
of April 1, 1933 at her and her husband’s practice and how young Nazis took turns blocking
patients from entering. She describes the young men as non-violent and had an “embarrassed
manner” when they explained what they were doing and patients continued to come and “easily
sneaked in.”89 Unlike the majority of Germans opposing the boycott, Joseph Goebbels, the
Minister of Propaganda and devoted follower of Hitler, viewed the boycott of April 1, 1933
differently:
The boycott against the international atrocity propaganda has burst forth in full
force in Berlin and the whole Reich…The boycott is a great moral victory for
Germany. We have shown the world abroad that we can call up the entire nation
without thereby causing the least turbulence or excesses. The Führer has once
more struck the right note…The effects of the boycott are already clearly
noticeable. The world is gradually coming to its senses.90
Goebbels believed the boycott was successful but in his diary entry for April 1st he stated
that the boycott would end at midnight, however, he did not say why it was called off because of
the lack of participation.91 Though most Germans did not participate in the boycott some did
participate by blocking customers from entering Jewish businesses. The boycott of April 1, 1933
was a failure for the Nazi party due to the lack of action by the majority of the German public.
The boycott lasted a day because most non-Jewish Germans continued giving Jewish Germans
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business rather than boycotting many businesses which Germans believed would harm the
economy.
The Third Reich received a more favorable response from the public by passing
antisemitic legislation than in antisemitic boycotts and violence. As a totalitarian government the
Third Reich did not need public approval for its actions, but it did want to convince the German
public that their actions against European Jewry were justified and it was to the Third Reich’s
advantage that antisemitism preexisted them.92 Though most Germans approved of antisemitic
legislation a slim minority actively voiced their dissent at all the Third Reich’s antisemitic
policies like Irene Harand.
Irene Harand was an Austrian leader in Vienna who toured Austria and England giving
lectures criticizing the Nazis. Harand refuted the Nazi’s antisemitic ideology of racial purity by
arguing that there is no such thing as a pure race. She also deconstructed the lies of Jewish usury
and blood libel which the Nazis spread in propaganda.93 Harand wrote on the antisemitic
legislation created by the Third Reich and noted several years before the Nuremberg race laws
were established, “It is self-evident that if a legislator designates a group as inferior, its
neighbors, competitors and others will treat it as inferior. Germany has become a hell for the
Jews who must remain there.”94 Harand was not alone in publicly voicing dissent against the
Third Reich and its antisemitic policies. Both protestant and catholic clergy such as Deitrich
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Bonhoeffer and Bernhard Lichtenberg publicly voiced their dissent through sermons and
writings.95
Irene Harand and others who publicly protested all the Third Reich’s antisemitic policies
were the minority. The response seen in 1933 of non-Jewish Germans supporting legislation but
not violence against German Jews was continued in the years leading up to the war. A 1935
Gestapo report concluded, “It is noteworthy that, whenever there are actions against the Jews,
these emanate chiefly from members of the party and its affiliated organizations, whereas the
majority of the population shows little participation in the Jewish question.”96 In Berlin the
president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht, wrote a letter to the Reich Minister of Economics
asking him to halt the boycott of Jewish businesses as Schacht was concerned over the effect it
would have on the economy. A meeting was held by the Party Representative Wagner, the Reich
Minister of the Interior, and Secretary of the State to discuss Schacht’s letter and it was noted
that Schacht’s protest violent boycotts of Jewish business was not because he favored Jews
rather, he was concerned for the economy, “Schacht rejected any suggestion that he might be
called pro-Jewish. All he was doing was to point out the results for his field of operations of
irresponsible incitement against the Jews.”97 Despite the German public’s aversion to violence
against Jewish Germans, the Reich continued encouraging outbursts of violence. In 1937 a
Sopade report was completed on a Catholic teacher who was anti-Nazi but supported antisemitic
legislation: “The Jews are for her another world. It is true that she finds barbarian their
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persecution and economic extermination. But she would think reasonable the introduction of a
numerus clausus[sic] and certain limitations on candidacy for the civil service.”98
Antisemititc legislation began before the infamous Nuremberg race laws in 1935 with
German Jews being removed from civil service positions in 1933, but they were still legally
considered citizens. The Jewish Germans' citizenship changed in 1935 when the Third Reich
established citizenship based on race. To advance the Nazi ideology of preserving a racially pure
Germany the Reich enacted the Nuremberg race laws. Marriages between Aryans and Jews were
forbidden as well as extra-marital intercourse. Existing marriages between Jews and Aryans
could be annulled by the state. Jews could not hire Germans under the age of forty-five to work
in their homes and Jews could not display the Nazi flag.99 Hitler then gave a speech to the
German public explaining why the Nuremberg laws were necessary:
. . . The only way to deal with the problem which remains open is that of
legislative action. The German Government is in this controlled by the thought
that through a single secular solution it may be possible still to create a level
ground [eine Ebene] on which the German people may find a tolerable relation
towards the Jewish people. Should this hope not be fulfilled and the Jewish
agitation both within Germany and in the international sphere should continue,
then the position must be examined afresh…Behind all three laws there stands the
National-Socialist Party and with it and supporting it stands the German nation.100
Most of the German public supported the Nuremberg Laws believing that with the status
of German Jews now being codified, legal precedence would quell the violent outbursts against
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German Jews.101 A Gestapo report in Berlin reveals it’s determination of the public mood on
these laws: “Jewry is converted into a national minority and gets through state protection the
possibility to develop its own cultural and national life.”102 More of the non-Jewish German
public supported the new antisemitic legislation found in the Nuremberg Laws. Peter Cullman,
who survived the Holocaust as a child, shared the strains the Nuremberg Laws created for his
parent’s marriage. His mother was Jewish and his father was not. In Peter’s memoir he describes
his father struggling with the prejudice he received from others for marrying a Jewish woman.103
Some Nazis argued that the new laws did not go far enough in segregation of Jews from German
society while even fewer voiced dissent against the antisemitic laws in its entirety.104
Despite the lack of support from most of the German public for state sanctioned boycotts,
the Third Reich continued with this policy, especially, when the Reich used the murder of
diplomat vom Rath by a Jewish young man as an excuse to attack Jewish business and homes.
German supporters of the Third Reich’s antisemitic policies took vom Rath’s murder by a Jewish
man to excuse furthering antisemitic policies. A protestant flier declared that the same “Jewish
volk” that killed Christ killed vom Rath.105 The Catholic clergyman, Donald Dietrich, and the
protestant pastor, Martin Niemoller, both prominent men delivered sermons against European
Jewry and perpetuated the Nazi rhetoric that Jews were, “Christ killers.”106 The murder of vom

101

David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism,

77.
102

“Gestapo Berlin, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/513,” in The Germans and the Final
Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism by David Bankier, 78.
103
Peter Cullman, Clandestinely: 1943-1945, United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum: Washington D.C. 2009, 1.
104
David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism,
78-79.
105
Doris L. Bergen, "Catholics, Protestants, and Christian Antisemitism in Nazi
Germany," 331-332.
106
Ibid, 334.

31
Rath served as fodder in antisemitic rhetoric and was to justify the widespread violence
witnessed in Reichskristallnacht.
The non-Jewish German public demonstrated a stronger response during the Kristallnacht
pogrom than in the April 1, 1933 boycott. As discriminatory laws excluding Jewish Germans
from the Third Reich continued to increase, violence by the Third Reich also increased when the
first pogrom, Kristallnacht, was ordered by the Third Reich. April 1, 1933 was an economic
boycott sanctioned by the Third Reich, however, Kristallnacht became the first pogrom. Ernest
Fontheim, a Jewish German, was a boy when he and his classmates witnessed the destruction of
Kristallnacht. “When I entered my classroom, some of my classmates were telling horror stories
of what they had seen on their way to school like smashed store windows of Jewish-owned
shops, looting mobs, and even burning synagogues.”107 Fontheim describes being dismissed from
school and on his way home watching a synagogue he attended burn. Fontheim does not say that
there were only one or two Nazis protesting as Dr. Paula Tobias described in her memoir of the
April 1, 1933 boycott. Instead, he explains that a “hostile crowd” formed and shouted antisemitic
slurs and then joined in attacking a Jewish ground-floor apartment.108 Y.S. Herz, a German Jew,
describes the Nazi attack during Kristallnacht that targeted the orphanage he ran and how he
went to the police for protection against the crowds rioting but was turned away.109 Like
Fontheim, Anita Dittman, a Jewish German, survived the Holocaust as a child and recounts
events of Kristallnacht in her autobiography. Her and her mother were warned by a non-Jewish
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neighbor to stay and hide in their apartment because a widespread riot against Jews was taking
place in their city. Dittman and her mother hid in their apartment for five days and listened to
non-stop sirens as synagogues burned and thousands of Jews were arrested.110 Compared to the
boycott of 1933, the pogrom of 1938 saw large participation by Nazi party members. It was not
until after the pogrom when damaged had been to homes and businesses causing non-Jewish
Germans insurance to rise to cover the damage did the German public condemn the violence, not
because they favored Jewish Germans, but because of the financial repercussions and the time
the public would have to spend cleaning up the damage.111
Antisemitism was firmly rooted in German society but it was not the only factor that
influenced the public’s acceptance of antisemitic policy. Propaganda also played a role in
influencing the German public to support the Reich’s actions against European Jews. Propaganda
acted as a tool for the Reich to disseminate its Nazi ideology among the masses. Nazi
propaganda perpetuated antisemitic myths and Nazi rhetoric against European Jews. Hitler
recognized the influence propaganda had over the public if used effectively.112 Hitler’s devoted
disciple, Joseph Goebbels, also recognized the effectiveness of well-crafted propaganda as a tool
to prompt Nazi ideology on race as he launched a series of antisemitic attacks on European Jews
in the media. Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda, created a series of antisemitic essays and
pamphlets presenting the invasion of Poland in 1939 as a war against a Jewish international
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conspiracy against non-Jews.113 Goebbels used the Nazi party’s racism to justify their ideology
for their conquest of Europe. The propaganda produced in newspapers, posters, essays, and
pamphlets portrayed the Nazi ideology of the Aryan’s struggle against Jews for living space in
Europe.114 The German public was not inundated with antisemitic propaganda on a daily basis.
Instead, Goebbels strategically launched multiple series of antisemitic propaganda throughout
certain points of the war reminding the German public that the war was the Jews’ fault.115
The idea of a “Jewish conspiracy” aimed to destroy non-Jews in Europe was not
introduced by the Nazis. Karl Lueger referenced a Jewish conspiracy to harm non-Jewish
Austrians in his political speech. Wilhelm Marr also referenced a Jewish conspiracy in his
pamphlet, “The Victory of Judaism over Germany.” A Russian based book, The Protocols of the
Elders of Zion, made available in central Europe after World War I though quickly revealed as a
forgery claimed to be a document written by Russian Jews outlining their plan to rule Europe.116
Despite being found as a forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion were used in Nazi
propaganda to promote their ideology of a Jewish conspiracy to destroy non-Jewish Germans.
Both Hitler and Goebbels acknowledge that The Protocols of the Elders of Zion was a fake but
they believed it held “inner truth” of a conspiracy.117 Der Sturmer, weekly circular published by
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Julius Streicher (another devoted follower of Hitler), promoted The Protocols and the Nazi
ideology of a Jewish conspiracy.118
The Der Sturmer played a key role in molding how the German public viewed European
Jews especially through its visual portrayal of the Nazi ideology of the German struggle against
Jews.119 The Third Reich recognized the Der Sturmer as a national newspaper and it had to be
displayed and copies made available in all German businesses.120 An example of how the Der
Sturmer portrayed European Jews to the German public is shown below (The headline reads,
“He came to Germany like this,” and the caption below the image says, “Without a solution to
the Jewish question, there can be no redemption of humanity.” ):

Figure 1. An Advertisement for the Anti-Semitic Tabloid Der Stuermer, 1935, United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum Photo Archives, courtesy of Jack J. Silverstein,
copyright of United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Used with permission from US
Holocaust Memorial Museum.
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When this edition of Der Sturmer was published it was offered inside all German
businesses, shown in display cases outside businesses, and plastered on walls. Julius Streicher’s
publication was so influential in shaping the German public’s perception of European Jews and
inciting violence against Jewish Germans that he was accused and found guilty at the Nuremberg
trials for crimes against humanity.121
Anita Dittman described being harassed by a group of school boys who were, “swollen
with Aryan pride and propaganda that told them to stamp out inferiors.”122Martin Koller, a nonJewish German, recognized that the Nazis were successful in using the radio as a tool to
disseminate propaganda, “Now I know the Nazis very consciously used this new instrument to
influence the masses.”123 Jutta Rudiger, a non-Jewish German and head of the Nazi League of
German Girls, describes being impressed by Hitler and uses favorable terms when recounting a
meeting she had with Hitler. Regarding the war she explains, “We didn’t go to war with any
great enthusiasm, but we thought Hitler was right.” She later admits to believing the propaganda
that Hitler invaded Poland because Germans were being persecuted.124 Dorothea Schlosser’s
father was non-Jewish and considered “Aryan” by the Reich and her mother was Jewish German.
She describes the mistreatment she endured in Nazi Germany as a result of her neighbors being
convinced of her inferiority by Nazi antisemitic propaganda. Dorothea admits she did not take
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the Nazis seriously even when they came to power until legislation was passed restricting halfJewish Germans admittance into universities. The Nazi’s antisemitic ideology did not become
real to her until she heard a remark made by her principal before she graduated from high school,
“There are Jews and there are Christians, but worst of all there are the half-breeds.”125 Klaus
Scheurenberg, a Jewish German who survived the Holocaust, recalls a shifting of attitude among
the group of commuters he traveled with daily on his way to perform forced labor. Klaus
explains that he saw this same group of commuters daily. He did not think they knew he was
Jewish as he described them being friendly towards him. The commuters invited Klaus to sit
with them, and they conversed as a fellow German until the day he arrived at the train with the
yellow Star of David he was forced to wear. The commuters noticed the yellow Star of David,
invited him to join them anyway, and offered Klaus a cigarette.126 Then he goes on to say:
Everybody smiled reassuringly at me for a few seconds, then the expression on
their faces changed. It was as if they suddenly realized they were betraying the
German people. During the last several years, they had been indoctrinated with
the idea that the Jews were Public Enemy Number One. They felt like traitors just
because they knew a 16-year-old Jewish boy. They never came back to that
compartment again. There was so much mistrust, they even avoided one another
after that day. Their behavior was typical of how people act under a
dictatorship.127
Though the German public’s view of European Jews was shaped by propaganda
conveying the messages of Nazi ideology, there was some resistance to Nazi propaganda in the
media. The Frankfurter Zeitung was one of the few periodicals from the Weimar years allowed
to continue under the Third Reich. Jewish Germans used the advertisement section of the
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newspaper to voice their protests against the Third Reich’s antisemitic laws.128 The German
public did oppose organs of the Nazi party such as Der Sturmer. It was not the antisemitic
rhetoric that Germans challenged. Rather the German people were repulsed by such publications
for inciting violence against Jewish Germans and their businesses.129
Antisemitism and Nazi propaganda fostered an environment for the German public to
accept antisemitic legislation. However, most of the German public detested the violence against
Jews encouraged by the Third Reich. Antisemitism preceding the Nazis made it easy for Hitler
and the Nazi party to use European Jews as scapegoats for Germany’s economic struggles and
the loss of World War I. The German public was accustomed to antisemitic rhetoric so Hitler’s
rhetoric was no different. The German public’s acceptance of antisemitic language coupled with
the barrage of Nazi ideology delivered through propaganda paved the way for the German public
to accept the Third Reich’s antisemitic laws but some drew a line at state sanctioned violence.
The non-Jewish German public supported antisemitic legislation or propaganda until violence
was used or encouraged. Then the German public protested the Third Reich’s use of violence
against German Jewry. Between Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 to the beginning years of World
War II the German public witnessed outbursts of violence culminating in Kristallnacht.
Immediately following Kristallnacht most of the German public abhorred the state sanctioned
violence. The German public had not yet witnessed deportations of Jewish Germans or their
mass murder, and their responses to these escalations remained to be seen. Would the German
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public sustain the pattern of accepting discrimination while objecting to violence or would their
response change as the Reich escalated its persecution of European Jews?

39
Chapter 3: German Public’s Response to Deportations and Genocide of European Jews,
1941-1945
It was just impossible to believe that people could be so evil and cruel. No one
really believed it. I say with my whole heart that we wouldn’t have believed it in
any case because we just didn’t think such things were possible. You tend anyway
to pretty much go along with the crowd. You believe certain things because you
want to believe them, you want to be able to sleep at night.
Ines Lyss, Voices from the Third Reich: An Oral History
With Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland in September 1939 leading to the outbreak of
World War II the attention of the majority of Germans turned from the persecution of German
Jewry to mobilizing for war. The non-Jewish Germans witnessed and confronted the
persecutions German Jews suffered under the Third Reich from antisemitic rhetoric and
ordinances to pogroms. While the majority of Germans supported antisemitic laws, they were
repulsed by the violent acts the Third Reich committed against German Jews. The majority of
public opinion would shift from repulsion toward violent acts against German Jewry to
indifference towards the mass murder of German Jewry. Once German Jews were isolated from
“Aryan” German and were removed from the German public through forced removal it was easy
for non-Jewish Germans to dismiss the rumors of mass murder as untrue and refuse to believe
them, especially when concerns for the war effort took precedence.
Daily life for German Jews living under Nazi rule continued to worsen as persecution led
by the Third Reich increased. Between Kristallnacht and Germany’s invasion of Poland on
September 1, 1939 two hundred twenty-nine laws against Jews were decreed then later an
additional five hundred twenty-five laws were passed.130 The onslaught of anti-Jewish mandates
made life increasingly unbearable for European Jews. Shortly after Kristallnacht in November

130

Marion A. Kaplan and Thomson Gale, Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in
Nazi Germany, 150.

40
1938 economic mandates were enforced banning the employment of Jews and banning Jews
from accessing their own bank accounts. In 1939 German Jews who lost employment were
forced into hard labor, welfare was taken from them, their possessions were confiscated, and
they were put on severe food rations.131 Beginning January 1, 1939 Jews in the Third Reich were
“forbidden to operate retail stores, mail-order houses, or sales agencies or to carry on trade
independently.”132 Jews could not be in charge of an enterprise or be in an executive position in a
business. Despite being banned from all employment German Jews had to pay a punitive fine of
one billion Reichsmarks for remaining in Germany.133
Once German Jews were isolated from employment Nazi Germany began forcing them
out. A letter from Hermann Goring to the Reich Minister of the Interior ordered that “the
emigration of the Jews from Germany is to be furthered by all possible means.”134 The Third
Reich used the murder of German diplomat, Ernst vom Rath, by a Polish Jew, Herschel
Grynszpan, as the pretext for the forced removal of Jews from Germany as conveyed by the
German Foreign Ministry Memorandum. “It is probably no coincidence that the fateful year of
1938… brought the Jewish question close to solution.”135 German Jews were evicted from their
homes on short notice and had to relocate to “Jewish” homes. With the threat of constant
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evictions and forced labor plaguing German Jews, their life was unbearable.136 Mounting antiJewish mandates from the Third Reich limited Jews in providing for their families. The titles of
doctor and attorney were stripped away from German Jews, businesses they owned and the
trades they worked in were snatched away. The economic isolation alone made life extremely
difficult for Jews in the Third Reich but the isolation from “Aryan” Germans would only
continue to increase.
Once the German Jews economic isolation was realized by 1941, through banning Jews
from employment in all businesses and limiting them on where and when they could shop for
provisions, the Nazis pursued the Jews social isolation.137 Private telephones and radios were
confiscated, limiting communication and access to media.138 German Jews struggled to procure
groceries for their family after forced labor when they were restricted to times and places they
could shop at so that they were not mingling with “Aryans.” Then German Jews had to choose
between procuring provisions in the limited time they had or visiting friends or family due to a
curfew imposed on them. German Jews were completely banned from places of enjoyment like
parks, theaters, restaurants, and cinemas, further segregating them from “Aryan” Germans.
The separation between German Jews and “Aryan” Germans widened in 1941 when the
Third Reich mandated that Jews wear a yellow Star of David on their clothing while they were
out in public. The same mandate was made in Poland in 1939 but it was not mandated in
Germany until September 1941. The mandate required that, “Jews over six years of age are
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prohibited to appear in public without wearing a yellow star.”139 By marking German Jews in
this way the Nazis ripped off any cloak of anonymity they could have hidden behind while living
in Nazi Germany. The mandate made German Jews vulnerable to antisemitic attacks by marking
them before the public.140 Jews remaining in Germany were forced to bear the yellow star on
their clothing while out in public, but their homes also had to be branded with the Star of David
making it convenient for Nazis to target the Jewish population in Germany.141 Before German
Jews were branded with the yellow Star of David their social isolation was already felt.
According to Ruth Kluger, a Viennese Jewish Holocaust survivor, her social isolation felt
complete before having to wear the yellow star, “I tend to think it was earlier, because
discrimination was already rampant.”142 Though the German Jews social isolation had already
begun before they were forced to wear the star, the mandate officially built a social wall between
Jewish Germans and non-Jewish Germans.
After Kristallnacht the economic and social isolation of Jews in Germany was realized by
the end of 1941. German Jews did not face as much harassment by the German public because
they were banned from workplaces and places of entertainment.143 The non-Jewish German
public had less opportunities to harass German Jews because “Aryan” Germans and Jewish
Germans were not allowed to interact, and the plethora of anti-Jewish mandates seemingly made
them disappear from the German social scene. Once Jewish Germans identified themselves by
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bearing a yellow Star of David the non-Jewish public were shocked at how many Jews remained
in Germany.144 Initially the German public was unsure of how to react to the public branding of
German Jews, some feared that in retribution Germans living in Ally countries would be forced
to wear a mark identifying themselves.145 The public’s shock would not last as they became
accustomed to seeing German Jews wearing the yellow star and the German public grew
insensitive towards the Jews.146 Wearing the yellow star made it easier for Jews to be targeted for
anti-Jewish hostility. Congregants complained to their priests at having to take communion with
converted Jews so the priests asked converted Jews to not attend services or if they did attend
services they needed to be “inconspicuous.”147 The security service reports or SD reports claimed
the public was in full support of Jews being forced to wear the yellow star and was initially
shocked at seeing how many remained in Germany, demonstrating an insensitivity toward the
discrimination suffered by the Jews. When Victor Klemperer, a Jewish man married to an
“Aryan” woman, was forced to wear the yellow star he refused to go out in public fearing that
his wife would be harassed.148 Erna Becker-Kohen, a Jewish woman married to an “Aryan,” and
her son had to wear the yellow star. Kohen’s young son was attacked by the neighborhood boys
when they realized he was Jewish, and Erna’s husband feared that the neighbors would attack his
wife and son when he was away.149 There were some small acts of sympathy towards Jews.
Groceries were saved and set aside for German Jews arriving at the end of their workday at the
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time allotted to them for shopping or small gifts of food were left at doorsteps and placed into
pockets. Ruth Kluger recalls when a man pressed an orange into her hand when he saw the
yellow Star of David on her.150 These few acts of sympathy were enough to catch Goebbels’ eye
as he remarked to Albert Speer, “People everywhere are showing sympathy for them. This
nation… is full of all kinds of idiotic sentimentality.”151 A decree was issued on October 24,
1941, punishing sympathetic acts with three months of imprisonment in a concentration camp.152
As the initial shock of seeing German Jews with the yellow star wore off and acts of sympathy
waned in the face of threatened reprisals, the German people hardened themselves towards the
Jewish population as is evident in Anna Haag’s account:
I traveled on the tram. It was overcrowded. An old lady got on. Her feet were so
swollen that they bulged out of the top of her shoes. She carried the Star of David
on her dress. I stood up to allow the lady to sit…. “Out!” Shouted a whole
choir…. The tram stopped. The driver ordered, “Both of you get out!”153
Now that the German Jews were economically and socially isolated from Nazi Germany
the next step for the Third Reich was the forced removal of German Jews from Germany.154
German Jews were evicted from their homes on short notice and assigned to Jewish ghettos or
taken directly to concentration camps completing their social isolation and total expulsion from
Germany.155 When the deportations first began 73,000 German Jews lived in Germany but by
1944 only 6,000 Jews remained.156 Once the removal of the Jewish public began, using
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euphemisms Goring gave directives to Heydrich for a “final solution” to the “Jewish question.”
Goring states, “I charge you furthermore to send me before long, an overall plan…of the desired
final solution of the Jewish question.”157 Germany had already expelled Polish Jews from
Germany in 1938 but then they began systematically expelling German Jews in 1941.158 The
orders Jews received to leave their homes were purposefully kept vague. German Jews were
unsure of their exact destinations or even if they would return.159 Initially when deportations
began in 1941 Jews married to “Aryans” were not deported, instead projected to be deported last.
The Third Reich began deporting German Jews married to “Aryans” in in 1943 but the war
ended before the Nazis could have all “privileged” Jews removed. When German Jews received
the deportation notice they were instructed on what they could take with them like a suitcase, a
set of clothes, a blanket etc. They also had to fill out paperwork on the possessions they were
leaving behind.160 German Jews knew they were being deported to eastern Europe but in the
beginning of the deportations they were unsure of what lay ahead for them.161 The ambiguity of
the deportation orders created fear among the Jews in Germany as family members were
deported to the east and not heard from again. Jews lived in fear of receiving a deportation
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notice, Hermann Rosenau recalls, “We constantly lived in fear…when more than three hundred
people, the sick and the healthy, were loaded on a freight train and deported.”162
Both German Jews and non-Jewish Germans witnessed groups of Jews walking or being
taken in trucks to train stations or meeting points to be deported. Workers in Berlin on their way
to work in the early morning hours watched vans full of Jews being driven to a train station for
their forced removal.163 Ruth Abraham describes a group of onlookers watching Jews gather for
their deportation: “Curious people had gathered in front of the building and were gloating over
the misery that had befallen their fellow citizens, the Jews….”164 Since Jews were banned from
public transport many Jews had to walk to the train stations or meeting points before being
transported to concentration camps.165
German Jews had to leave behind their homes and most of their possessions when they
were expelled from Germany. The possessions left behind were auctioned off to “Aryans” who
“fought like jackals over a carcass.”166 Many “Aryan” Germans witnessed Jews gathering for
deportations and many purchased the items and homes German Jews left behind. Before the
German public detested witnessing the violent acts committed by the Third Reich against
German Jews but now that they were being removed from Germany the public did not protest
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and the violent acts that had elicited such opposition were now to be conducted out of sight from
the German public.
Those who were members of the Nazi party supported the removal of Jews from
Germany while the majority of the population were indifferent to the forced evacuations of their
Jewish neighbors.167 The forced removal of German Jewry occurred while Nazi Germany was
fighting World War II. Ordinary civilians were concerned more for their men fighting on the
front, food rationing, labor shortages, and air raids than in the fate of an unwanted people
group.168 The majority of the German public was so unconcerned with the forced removal of
Jewish Germans that SD reports hardly took note of the public’s reaction.169 Ursula von Kardorff
recounts an observer saying, “Why should I care about the Jews? The only thing I think about is
my brother in Russia.”170 Some voiced their dissent to the deportations but the only protest
against the deportations occurred in 1943 in Rosenstrasse, Berlin when Jewish men were taken
from their forced labor jobs to be deported. The men’s “Aryan” wives gathered at where their
Jewish husbands were being held and protested their deportations, they protested until all 1,500
men were released.171 For most Germans their concern for the removal of their Jewish neighbors
went as far as wondering about their destination- “We found out that the entire family had
disappeared. Naturally we asked ourselves where they could be….”172 The same non-Jewish
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Germans repulsed at witnessing violent acts against Jewish Germans now did not have to be
troubled by the violence because German Jews were forced out of Germany and their murder
occurred of the sight of the German public. The same non-Jewish public with their deeply rooted
antisemitism did not prioritize wondering about the fate of an alienated minority group when
they had family members fighting in a war to be concerned about. The majority of Germans were
uninterested in discovering the answer to their question of where could the German Jews be?
The ambiguity as to what awaited German Jews after they were removed from Germany
did not last as rumors circulated among both Jews and “Aryans” on what happened to those
removed to the east.173 A secret meeting was led by Heydrich with leaders of various Nazi
agencies to coordinate efforts to systematically murder European Jews or the “Final Solution” as
Heydrich and others had code named it. At their meeting they decided on a plan to deport
European Jews to concentration camps where they would be murdered.174 The plan for organized
mass murder, the “Final Solution,” fit in the context of the Nazi’s ideology for making living
space, lebensraum, for only “Aryan” Germans.175 Jewish Germans had no place in Nazi ideology
and those still in Germany and living in Nazi occupied Europe needed to be removed, according
to the Nazi’s mind. Victor Klemperer recorded in his diary in 1942 rumors that deported Jews
were being shot. Those who had radios listened in secret to BBC reports on the mass murder of
European Jews and other minorities led by the Third Reich.176 As the forced removal of German
Jews continued with no word returning from relatives who were taken, deportations equated to
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death for Jews still in Germany.177 Inge Deutschkron heard rumors about murders in the east and
refused to believe it was true until an “Aryan” friend confirmed it to her.178 Ruth AndreasFriedrich, an “Aryan” German woman secretly hiding Jews heard about the rumors and
described them as “ghastly.” Soldiers also wrote letters confirming the rumors that European
Jews were being murdered.179 Anita Dittman, whose mother was Jewish, and father was “Aryan”
German, heard “horror stories,” about the fate of deported Jews.180
If German Jews who were banned from owning radios or telephones heard rumors about
gassings and mass shootings of Jews, then Aryans who had full access to the media and spoke
with soldiers on leave from the front were aware of the rumors circulating about the mass murder
of European Jewry. German prisoners of war shared their knowledge of the mass murder of Jews
with the Allies.181 Dorothea Schlosser performing for Nazi soldiers in Poland was told by
soldiers, “the horrible things happening to the Jews….”182 Peter Pechel recounts a German
colonel describing how Jews were sealed in a tunnel and gassed to death.183 The White Rose
resistance group released leaflets to the German public asking how they can be apathetic when
300,000 Jews were murdered.184 A German Jew hiding his identity heard conversations from
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civilians at bars and theaters discussing mass shootings of European Jews.185 An SD report from
April 1940 shared that soldiers on leave were discussing the killing of Jews with German
civilians.186 Hermann Friedrich Graebe, a civilian working for a construction firm with the
Wehrmacht, witnessed mass shootings of men, women, and children.187 The population of a
village of Wohlau were onlookers to the murder of hundreds of Jews.188 Anti-Nazi organizations
like the White Rose and Kampf dem Faschismus circulated BBC reports on the mass murder of
Jews. Allies also dropped leaflets over German cities sharing about the number of Jews
murdered by the Third Reich.189 Even foreigners like the British Foreign Minister, Anthony
Eden, was aware of the tragedy occurring to European Jewry. In his letter Eden explains that a
half million of Jews were gassed and burned in a crematorium at Birkenau, a death camp.190 If
BBC reports and foreign ministers were aware of the mass murder of European Jews so were the
Germans. The majority of Germans, both Jewish and non-Jewish, heard rumors of the mass
murder of European Jews. Though the details were distorted on how European Jews were
murdered, the German public was aware that Jews were being removed from Germany and
murdered.
Even before deportations began and rumors of mass murder circulated, the German
public were aware of Nazi Germany’s intention of creating a society where European Jews could
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not exist. In 1941 Hitler gave a speech to the Reichstag calling for the annihilation of European
Jewry. In 1942 he gave a speech in Berlin then in Munich explaining that the war would result in
European Jew’s extermination.191 Hitler’s speeches were posted on the front page of all national
newspapers, broadcasted on radio, and disseminated through pamphlets and posters.192 Goebbels
and Goring both made public speeches threatening to exterminate European Jewry during the
war.193 In 1943 Goebbels gave a speech in Berlin to the German public justifying the Third
Reich’s anti-Jewish policies- “Germany, in any event, has no intention of bowing before this
Jewish threat, but rather intends to act at the right moment, using if necessary the most total and
radical measures to deal with Jewry.”194 Even Robert Ley, the Head of Germany’s Labor Front,
made speeches to German laborers warning that if European Jewry were not exterminated
Germany would lose the war.195 The German public may not have known about death camps or
how European Jews were being murdered but they knew, even before deportations of German
Jews began, that the Third Reich intended to remove all European Jews and other minority
groups from Nazi society.
Considering the negative responses, the non-Jewish Germans had towards the Third
Reich’s violence against Jews before 1939, the Germans should have been repulsed upon hearing
rumors of the mass murder of Jews. Many German civilians did not witness the shootings or
gassings of European Jews, therefore, the majority of Germans refused to believe the rumors that
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the Nazi government was murdering Jews. By 1943 Germans ignored the rumors of murder of
European Jewry and were concerned with the setbacks Nazi Germany faced in the war.196 A
security service report noted that the populace was concerned with the war and the lives of their
family members being sacrificed on the front.197
Many Germans could not believe the rumors that a government would systematically
murder an entire people group. Ursula von Kardorff on reading the testimonies of escaped Jews
describing the gassings responded, “Is one to believe such a ghastly story? It simply cannot be
true. Surely even the most brutal fanatic could not be so bestial.”198 Even German Jews struggled
to believe that European Jews were being murdered. Dorothea Schlosser a half-Jewish German
who survived the war explains, “...Jews who were Germans themselves, couldn’t comprehend
what was happening to them. They refused to believe it.”199 Ines Lyss echoes the same belief
upon hearing rumors of mass murder, “It was just impossible to believe that people could be so
evil and cruel. No one really believed it.”200 Peter Pechel also refused to believe the German
colonel’s story of a gassing tunnel until he talked to his father imprisoned at a concentration
camp and asked if the rumors were true, his father confirmed that it was.201 Many refused to
believe the rumors were true, and only accepted the truth when the rumors were corroborated
with eyewitness testimonies or evidence. Lilo Clemens’s Jewish father who was married to an
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“Aryan” worked for the Nazis filing documents on the murder of Jews. Clemens explained, “it’s
unbelievable, but it’s true! The Nazis wanted to exterminate the Jewish people….”202
There were few Germans who protested the murder of Jews, if they did protest, they
risked being sent to a camp themselves or executed like the leaders of the White Rose group.
Then there were those who willingly participated in mass murder like SS-Obersturmfuherer, Karl
Kretschmer, who justified the murder of Jews in a letter to his wife, “As the war is in our opinion
a Jewish war, the Jews are first to feel it. Here in Russia, wherever the German soldier is no Jew
remains.”203 After witnessing the mass shooting of Jews the head of 2nd company, Reserve
Police Battalion 13 only protested that the shootings were occurring in front of civilians.204 A
war correspondent witnessing the mass executions of a group of Jews saw SD men weeping and
others keeping score of those they killed. The soldiers justified the murders to him, “death was
certain for them, they said…such afflicted people would never be permitted to return to the
homeland [Germany].”205
The majority of Germans aware of the mass murder of European Jews willingly chose to
deny that the rumors were true, instead, they dismissed it as anti-Nazi propaganda or believed it
was too incredulous to be true.206 The majority of the German public did not openly support the
mass murder of Jews, nor did they protest it. Instead, the majority of the German public chose to

202

Lilo Clemens, “There Goes a Jew Girl,” in Voices from the Third Reich: An Oral
History, 291.
203
“Letters of SS-Obersturmfuhrer Karl Kretschmer (SK 4a),” in “The Good Old Days:”
The Holocaust as Seen by its Perpetrators and Bystanders, 163.
204
“The Head of 2nd Company, Reserve Police Battalion 13,” in “The Good Old Days:”
The Holocaust as Seen by its Perpetrators and Bystanders, 127.
205
“A War Correspondent on the ‘Unfortunate’ Murderers.” In “The Good Old Days:”
The Holocaust as Seen by its Perpetrators and Bystanders, 129.
206
David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion Under Nazism,
115.

54
not believe the rumors corroborated by eyewitness testimonies, as David Bankier states, “They
knew enough to know that it was better not to know more.”207 The majority of Germans did not
protest or fully support the isolation of Jews from economic and social life. They did not protest
the deportations of German Jews from Germany. The anti-Jewish mandates and the forced
removal of German Jews occurred amid World War II. Non-Jewish Germans had their own
immediate concerns that trumped concerns for the trials of a minority people group they had
previously tolerated before Hitler came to power. Non-Jewish Germans were concerned over
family members fighting on the front, air raids from Allies, and military setbacks during the war.
Perhaps if there was no war and they were forced to face the reality of the mass murder of
European Jewry the German public would have reacted, but Germany was fighting a war and
those concerns were easily prioritized over addressing the fate of European Jewry.
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Chapter 4: The Majority of the German Public’s Response to the Holocaust
When I entered the courtyard, I saw young Jews digging graves—large, deep
graves. The older Jews were being shot in the back of the neck…. The sight of all
the blood, along with the smell, made me sick and I collapsed…. I joined our
advance unit and confided only to my closest friends my feelings that we were
going to have a lot to answer for if we lost the war.
Rudolf Wurster, Voices from the Third Reich
The German public’s response to the Third Reich’s anti-Jewish policies shifted over the
course of the Nazi’s rule. Most of the German public supported anti-Jewish decrees like laws that
banned German Jews from holding civil service occupations or laws that stripped German Jews
of their rights. With the removal of German Jews from certain occupations, those jobs became
available for “Aryan” Germans. Most Germans did not voice outrage when German Jews lost
their rights because of a deep-seated antisemitism that viewed German Jews as a foreign people
not belonging to Germany. Most of the German public, however, did oppose the Third Reich’s
early use of violence towards German Jewry. When World War II began with Germany’s
invasion of Poland and the Nazi regime increased repression of public criticism against the Third
Reich, the German people withdrew into its own private sphere keeping its criticisms to itself
and focusing their attention, not on the fate of a marginalized people, but on their own immediate
concerns like air raids and setbacks in the war. When the Jews fate was discussed among
German civilians it was after a series of air raids from the Allies. The Germans feared the
bombings were in retaliation for how the Third Reich treated European Jewry. Most Germans
were not indifferent towards the persecutions of European Jewry, most were ambivalent. When
they heard rumors of mass shootings of Jewish civilians many Germans were shocked, however,
they refused to believe the rumors or for most, they were not interested in discovering the truth
because they had more immediate concerns in their daily lives than in knowing the true fate of a
marginalized, minority group.

56
Most Germans accepted the Third Reich’s antisemitic policies if they stayed within a
non-violent, legal framework such as the Nuremberg laws including and up to expelling Jews
from Germany.208 A majority of Germans did not support state sanctioned violence against
German Jews. They were repulsed by the violence used during the November 1938 pogrom
where synagogues, Jewish homes, and businesses were damaged and German Jews were
attacked. Many Germans did not oppose anti-Jewish measures but if it crossed the line into statesanctioned violence they opposed it. When the forced removal of Jews began from Germany the
Third Reich mailed notices to German Jews for them to leave their property on short notice and
gather at a meeting point so that they could be transported to Poland or the “east.” Many
Germans voiced little dissent at the removal of their Jewish neighbors because they benefitted
from acquiring Jewish property left behind and it was the Nazi’s goal to expel all minority
groups, they deemed undesirable from the Third Reich. As Germans witnessed the forced
removal of their Jewish neighbors to the “east,” they watched German Jews leave behind their
homes and possessions. Jewish homes were sealed with most of their possessions still in their
homes as they were given directives on what they could take with them on their transports to the
“east.” Once German Jews were expelled from their homes, the seal was broken, and their
possessions auctioned off and their home sold. The German’s actions of taking their Jewish
neighbor's possessions or moving into their homes imply that Germans were aware that the
deportations meant Jews would never return to lay claim to their property.209 Some Germans
seemed to portray feelings of guilt after acquiring Jewish owned homes as the new owners
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experienced panic attacks or complained that the home had to be redone because they could not
live with “Jewish furniture.”210 Then others who moved into homes previously belonging to
German Jews justified their ownership because they had lost their own property to air raids.
After 1941 as the Third Reich began to advance in Europe and acquire more territory, and
greater numbers of minority groups such as European Jews, its goal of eradicating Jews from
Europe became clearer with the pursuit of the “Final Solution.”211 It was not enough for German
Jews to be removed from Germany to another country. According to Nazi ideology they could
not continue to exist. The “Jewish problem” had to be solved through mass murder. Most of the
German public, having voiced criticism early on against the Third Reich for using violent
measures against German Jews, now in 1941 to 1945 refused to believe the rumors that the
Germans Jews who were “relocated” were in fact being murdered. Knowledge of the mass
killings of European Jews led by the Third Reich was widespread among the German public but
their knowledge was incomplete. The German public was aware of mass shootings, such as the
ones that occurred at Babi Yar and Riga, but they were not aware of Auschwitz or of gas
chambers.212 Once deportations of German Jews began, rumors traveled from the east of mass
shootings of Jewish civilians. Soldiers on leave from the front shared testimonies with their
family and friends of witnessing or taking part in the mass murder of European Jews.213 Rumors
of mass shootings circulated among the German public but exact details such as death camps,
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gassings, and cremation were not known but the German public was aware that atrocities against
Jews were being committed in the east.214 Some rumors of gassings circulated among the public
but they were far less prevalent than rumors of mass shootings. A woman in Munich who spoke
out against Hitler and was punished with three years in prison for her criticism was one of the
few who shared rumors to her neighbors that Jews were being gassed in the east.215 Most
Germans were not aware of the scope of the systematic mass murder until after the war when
concentration camps were liberated by the Allies and the Nuremberg trials in 1945 to 1946
revealed the magnitude of the genocide of European Jews.216 Rumors of mass killings of Jews
first began with the invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 but it was not until the
deportations of Jews from Germany began that stories of mass shootings widely circulated.217 In
1941 the first news of mass killings at Babi Yar and Kiev, and then later Riga reached the
German public. The SS followed behind the Wehrmacht on the frontlines and were assigned to
the execution of Jewish civilians so that the Wehrmacht would remain shielded from the horrible
task. The Wehrmacht, however, did participate in the mass murder of European Jews by helping
to organize the mass shootings and witnessing them.218 Fritz Nast-Kolb a “half Jewish” German
who survived the war by working at Bosch electrical company recounts that he knew
deportations meant death though he was not aware of the extent of the systematic mass murder of
Jews. Nast-Kolb, like many Germans, struggled to accept as truth what seemed to be the fate of
deported Jews. “We did hear something that was filtered through by soldiers at the front to the
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effect that the Jews who had been transported to Riga back in 1941 had all been shot…. You
didn’t believe it; you didn’t want to believe it.”219 Another example of disbelief comes from
Hans Gunther Seraphin testimony, he served in the German Army and was a witness in the
Nuremberg trials. He describes finding out about the systematic mass murder of European Jews
in 1944 but he believed it was anti-Nazi propaganda. It was not until he served in the Nuremberg
trials that the news of mass murder was confirmed to be true, “I was sick. It was so incredibly
hard to believe.”220 Karl-Heinz Maier a “half Jew” drafted into the Wehrmacht and later
discharged also describes his shock at hearing of soldiers murdering Jews“I overheard a few older soldiers discussing the price of a pistol. The one who
wanted to sell it said, ‘This is really a first-rate piece. I tested it out myself. Jews
are being shot here. I was out yesterday and shot three or four of them…’ this was
an extraordinarily shocking experience for me. These were not SS men; they were
simple privates.”221
Victor Klemperer, a Jewish survivor, recorded his shock in his diary at the news of mass
shootings of Jews and he did not believe the Third Reich had planned to murder European Jewry,
instead, he believed that the Third Reich’s mass murder of Jews was in reaction to the war.222
Hans-Ulrich Greffrath, an officer in the Wehrmacht, only believed the rumors of mass
executions when in 1947 he saw a documentary on Auschwitz: “I was forced to believe that the
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horrible crimes that I had heard were committed by the Nazi regime were true. Ever since then…
my life has been one of terrible shame.”223
The rumors of mass killings continued to circulate during the war as the Third Reich
faced defeats and the fate of the war began to look grim for the Nazis. Both German civilians and
soldiers feared retribution from the Allies for the violence and murder of European Jewry led by
the Third Reich.224 Those who were complicit in the mass murder of European Jewry justified
their actions then hid their evidence of complicity. Those Germans who participated in the mass
murder of European Jews insisted that the Jews were guilty of the war and that if the Third Reich
did not murder all European Jews, then the Jews would exact equal or greater vengeance. Kurt
Mobius, part of the police battalion, justified his actions by stating that he believed the antiJewish propaganda and was following orders: “The Jewish people were not innocent but guilty. I
believed all the propaganda that Jews were criminals and subhuman….”225 A Swedish
correspondent in Germany in 1943 noticed that Goebbels allowed news of mass killings of Jews
to circulate among the public and remarked, “Everyone is conscious of shared responsibility and
guilt, and afraid of personal retaliation.”226 Even SD reports noted that Germans feared
retaliation from Allies for the state-sanctioned violence against European Jews.227 Soldiers
having witnessed the mass murders or took part in it also feared vengeance from Jews in the
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international community.228 An SD report explained that even Germans who did not support the
Nazis believed it was imperative for the Third Reich to win the war or “Jewish revenge” would
be great.229 Rudolf Wurster, who served in the Luftwaffe and Waffen-SS, witnessed the mass
shooting of Jewish men and women. He was so shocked and sickened at what he witnessed that
he passed out, “I joined our advance unit and confided only to my closest friends my feelings
that we were going to have a lot to answer for if we lost this war.”230 Another soldier, Walter
Kassler, while on leave from the front, visited his sister and brother-in-law and alluded to having
witnessed the murder of Jewish civilians while fighting in the Soviet Union. His brother-in-law
recorded what Walter told him: “Certainly it has gone so far that they will do to us as it was done
to them, if we should lose the war.”231 As it became evident that the tide of the war was turning
against the Nazis, Himmler urged that the mass murder of European Jews be kept secret and that
all evidence be destroyed. In 1943, Himmler addressed SS officers in Posen and warned them
that the mass murder of Jews could not be spoken about- “This is a page of glory that has never
been written and is never to be written.”232 In 1945 death camps closed as gas chambers and
crematoriums were dismantled, bodies at mass graves were exhumed and burnt to hide evidence
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of the Third Reich’s systematic mass murder of European Jewry and other minority groups.233
Those imprisoned at concentration camps were forced to leave them on death marches that some
German civilians witnessed. Barns and sheds used to house Jewish victims on these marches
were later burnt to hide evidence of complicity.234 The SS destroyed a great amount of evidence
of the atrocities committed against European Jews towards the end of the war. Gunter Kunert,
having lived in Berlin as a child during the war recalls witnessing the destruction of evidence
tied to the persecution of Jews- “...Papers are taken out, documents, passports, photographs, any
indication of one’s own complicity… straight into the fires of purgatory with all that
incriminating material.”235 With Nazi Germany’s impending defeat, participants in the “Final
Solution” scrambled to hide or destroy evidence of complicity.
Considering how the German public detested the Kristallnacht pogrom and statesanctioned violence towards European Jews, most of the German public, upon hearing
widespread rumors of mass killings in the east, responded in ambivalence. Though the large
majority were ambivalent to the fate of the Jews some put their own lives at risk to oppose the
atrocities being committed against German Jews. Kurt Jacobsen was protected by his “Aryan”
employer. Inept at managing his business, this German hid Kurt so that he could run the
operation for him.236 The Third Reich increased repression of political dissidents with
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imprisonment or executions causing the German public to keep their concerns even more to
themselves.237 With the removal of Jews from society, Germans were insulated from their
persecution, and with the hardships they were experiencing from the war increasing their concern
for European Jews was superseded by their own challenges.238 With the German Jews out of
sight, the German public showed decreased interest in antisemitic propaganda produced by the
Third Reich. Upon watching two antisemitic films it was reported that the public complained at
having to watch the films, “We’ve already seen The Jew Süss and we’ve had enough of the
Jewish trash.”239 The German public was not opposed to how the antisemitic films portrayed
Jews, they were opposed to having to still watch antisemitic propaganda when the “Jewish
problem” seemed to have been resolved in Germany with their expulsion. The German
population gave little to no protest against isolating German Jews from society through laws then
expelling them from Germany, but they were opposed to witnessing state sanctioned violence
against Jews, which suggests that there was not widespread support among most of the German
public for the mass killing of European Jews.240 The German public viewed the antisemitic
discrimination led by the Third Reich through rhetoric, propaganda, and laws as acceptable but
state led violence was inacceptable. However, most Germans did not protest the rumors of mass

1933-45,” The Germans and the Holocaust: Popular Responses to the Persecution and Murder
of the Jew, 72.
237
Ian Kershaw, Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution, 200.
238
David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion Under Nazism,
139-140.
239
“Boelcke, Kriegspropaganda, entries for 12 Sep. and 26 Nov. 1940,” in The Germans
and the Final Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism,140.
240
Frank Bajohr, “Chapter 2: German Responses to the Persecution of the Jews as
Reflected in Three Collections of Secret Reports,” The Germans and the Holocaust: Popular
Responses to the Persecution and Murder of the Jews, 52.

64
killings or condemn the Third Reich, and instead remained silent and focused on their own
wartime challenges.
The responses of the German public to the systematic, mass murder of European Jews led
by the Third Reich cannot be examined in isolation from World War II. The mass murder of
European Jewry occurred in conjunction with the events of the war. The concern for the fate of
the Jewish population after they were expelled from Germany was of little import to the German
public during the war years. The German public was not interested in the “Jewish question” or in
pursuing the rumors of mass shootings of Jewish civilians in the east. The German public
focused on more immediate concerns that directly involved them such as air raids, fearing for
family fighting on the front, and economic instability.241 European Jews were a marginalized
minority discriminated against prior to the Nazis coming to power. With the Third Reich’s rule
the Jews were gradually and systematically isolated from the rest of society so when they were
physically removed from Germany they were out of sight and out of mind, so to speak, from the
German public.242 Though the German public grew less concerned for the fate of the Jews, they
discussed the violence committed against Jews when air raids occurred and they feared that the
Allies were exacting revenge for how the Jews were treated.243 The fate of European Jewry was
not a concern of the German public, especially when faced with air raids.244 After air raids in
Hamburg in July and August of 1943 the Germans living there complained the bombing was in
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retaliation for attacking Jews in the November 1938 pogrom.245 SD offices made many reports
on statements from the German public specifically linking the air raids to the suffering European
Jews endured under the Third Reich. Air raids were of the utmost concern for the German public
for they directly experienced the war and lost their homes and loved ones to them. Fritz NastKolb remarks that the fear of air raids even trumped his fear of being deported to the east which
he knew meant death, “The air raid siren sounded constantly, and you had to keep running back
to the bunker…. The air raids and being amid everything that was happening made our own fate
seem relatively unimportant.”246
The German public was also preoccupied with how long the war was lasting since Hitler
had promised that the Third Reich would achieve a quick victory in Europe.247 After the Third
Reich suffered a serious loss at Stalingrad, the German public grew even more anxious about the
future of the war and its longevity. The public mood in support for Hitler declined as the public
grew weary of the war and had extreme misgivings about the losses the military faced in the
Soviet Union and North Africa.248 Fearing constant air raids, losses on the war front, and
economic instability the German public was preoccupied with fears much more urgent than the
“Jewish question.” The Swedish ambassador made this observation of the German public:
A visitor to Berlin is struck by the… complete apathy displayed by the people,
who were entirely absorbed by the material difficulties of every-day life. Lack of
goods and of manual labour, blackouts and other inconveniences were their chief
interest, and not the questions of international Jewry, Freemasonry, and
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Bolshevism. [All these topics] met with complete lack of interest from the
public.249
Rudolf Semmler, who worked for Goebbels, submitted reports from German civilians that were
to track the public mood on the war effort. Semmler’s reports noted that the German public was
unhappy with the course of the war and the toll it was taking with the number of losses. The
public complained that the antisemitic propaganda was unimportant compared to the setbacks
occurring in the war and they feared the vengeance Jews would seek if the Third Reich lost the
war.250 After Germany’s defeats at Stalingrad and El Alamain, criticisms grew against the
continued antisemitic propaganda being pumped out to the public when more relevant concerns
of wartime struggles were on the German people’s mind.251
The systematic, mass murder of European Jews and other minorities was a process that
began with the Nazis legalizing acts of discrimination against European Jews.252 The German
public approved steps to legally and socially isolate Jews from society. The German Jews
isolation began with the numerous laws restricting Jews from participating in society with
“Aryan” Germans, they were stripped of their rights, then once Jews were isolated, they were
physically removed from Germany. The majority of Germans approved of these anti-Jewish
policies led by the Third Reich until the policies turned violent. Once Jews were physically
removed and the German public no longer had to witness the violence, it was easier for the
German public to deny the rumors of mass murder as unbelievable. As concerns for their own
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hardships increased with the failing war effort, mounting casualties, and constant bombing, most
of the German public became ambivalent. Rumors of mass shootings of a marginalized, minority
people mattered little amidst the immediate problems that directly affected the German public
who was growing evermore concerned about the future of Germany. However, those who
participated in, witnessed, or believed the rumors about the atrocities being committed against
the Jews feared retaliation as the Allies advanced. The German response to the Holocaust was
inextricably linked to the German war effort. The frail opposition Germans did muster against
early violence toward Jews dissolved as the physical isolation of this disenfranchised group and
the failures of the German military created the conditions in which German’s own fears and
hardships eclipsed any concerns for the suffering of Jews.
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